This article aims to clarify a growing misconception amongst Maryland practitioners that wrist and ankle injuries are required to be treated as hand and foot injuries for purposes of permanent partial disability (“PPD”). As will be argued, the correct reading of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) reflects that Workers’ Compensation Commissioners are vested with the authority to treat the loss of a wrist or ankle as either the loss of a hand or foot, or alternatively, as the loss of an arm or leg. Although greater focus will be placed on wrist injuries, the analysis provided herein is just as applicable to ankle injuries.
PPD: Scheduled and Non-Scheduled Losses
There are four general types of workers’ compensation disability benefits: temporary total and temporary partial, as well as permanent total and permanent partial. The Act provides directives for calculating individual awards based on the severity and extent of a given injury. After an employee reaches maximum medical improvement, he or she is no longer entitled to an indefinite, temporary disability award. Nevertheless, the employee could then potentially qualify for permanent disability.
For permanency purposes, the Act grants the Commissioner who presides over a Workers’ Compensation Commission (“WCC”) hearing the authority to award compensation for the loss or “loss of use” of certain body parts to a certain percentage.[1] For example, the Act provides 250 weeks of compensation for the loss of a foot, which reflects a 100% loss of use.[2] The same is true for the loss of a hand.[3] In contrast, leg and arm injuries are compensated at a rate of 300 weeks.[4] However, the WCC has the ability to find that a particular claimant has lost less than 100% of a “scheduled member.” Therefore, if the WCC were to find a 50% loss of a foot, a claimant would be entitled to 125 weeks of compensation, rather than 250 weeks.
The breakdown of compensation due for specific PPD awards is set forth in L&E § 9-627. Therein, subsections (a) through (j) outline the compensation rates for various “scheduled member” losses. For non-scheduled members, L&E § 9-627(k) applies. Also regarded as “other cases” injuries, subsection (k) states:
In all cases of permanent partial disability not listed in subsections (a) through (j) of this section, the Commission shall determine the percentage by which the industrial use of the covered employee’s body was impaired as a result of the accidental personal injury or occupational disease.[5]
Scheduled members include arms, legs, hands, feet, eyes, ears and fingers.[6] Non-scheduled members, or “other cases” injuries, include the neck, chest, back and shoulders.[7] All variations of PPD benefits are based on a pre-determined range of compensation for a specified period of weeks.[8] For non-scheduled injuries, subsection (k) provides the appropriate scale of 500 weeks.
How to Calculate PPD for Wrist & Ankle Injuries
The principle issue this article seeks to address deals with the precise compensation due for the loss of a covered employee’s wrist or ankle, as they are the only body parts listed in subsections (a) through (j) of L&E § 9-627 that do not have a precise rate of compensation allotted for their “loss of use.”[9] While the other body parts listed in L&E § 9-627 are referenced in terms of a general loss of use, wrists and ankles are only referenced in the context of amputations. Further, the WCC Commissioner has unique discretion over wrist and ankle claims, as opposed to other types of injuries. Specifically, subsection (g) of L&E § 9-627 states:
(1) An amputation at or above the wrist or ankle may be apportioned to the loss of the use of the arm or leg, but may not be less than the compensation for the loss or loss of use of a hand or foot;
(2) Amputation at or above the elbow shall be considered the loss of an arm;
(3) Amputation at or above the knee shall be considered the loss of a leg.
Moreover, as explained above, subsection (k) of section 9-627 is the “catchall” provision and provides compensation for the “cases of permanent partial disability not listed in subsections (a) through (j).” Though relatively straight forward, the applicability of L&E § 9-627(k) is somewhat unclear in the context of wrist or ankle injuries. This is because there is no Maryland case law that has applied subsection (k) to either of the two body parts.[10]
As a practical matter, for purposes of PPD, wrists are generally considered part of the hand rather than part of the arm,[11] and ankles are generally considered part of the foot rather than part of the leg.[12] That said, in light of the legislature’s silence and coupled with a lack of judicial guidance, it is not unheard of for a Commissioner to stray from the norm and, for example, treat a wrist injury as a loss of an arm instead of a hand.[13] For that reason, it would be helpful for a Maryland appellate court to clarify, at the very minimum for the sake of judicial consistency, whether a wrist is properly compensable as an injury to either the hand or arm.
How are Ambiguities Interpreted Under the Act?
According to the Maryland Court of Appeals, ambiguities found within Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article are resolved consistent with the procedure used for other areas of the Maryland Code.[14] An ambiguity arises where a particular statute or provision therein is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.[15]
The primary goal of a court charged with interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intentions of the legislature.[16] Courts are first required to give a statute’s text its literal and plain English meaning, and when doing so provides for but one reasonable interpretation, the inquiry necessarily reaches its end.[17] Only where the plain English is subject to multiple readings will courts draw on secondary considerations.[18] Classic principles of statutory construction include considering legislative history, prior case law, common law and the statute’s underlying purpose or goals.[19]
One recent example of how the Workers’ Compensation Act is interpreted in Maryland is the 2013 case of Montgomery County v. Robinson. There, the Court of Appeals held that scheduled and non-scheduled losses arising from a single accidental injury may be combined for purposes of calculating PPD for any of the Act’s three “tiers” of compensation.[20] The issue arose in light of L&E §§ 9-629 and 9-630; the former dealing with disability compensation in the range of 75-250 weeks, and the latter for 250 weeks and above (also known as serious disability).[21] More specifically, L&E § 9-630 expressly allowed combining scheduled and non-scheduled injuries for the purpose of attaining serious disability, whereas L&E § 9-629 was silent as to whether such a combination was permissible for a tier two award.[22]
The court determined that L&E § 9-629 was ambiguous, as it could be reasonably read to allow or preclude the combining of scheduled and non-scheduled injuries to attain a tier two award.[23] Prior to reaching the court, the WCC had awarded compensation at a tier two rate after combining a hand/wrist injury (which was viewed as a scheduled loss) and a back injury (which was viewed as a non-scheduled loss).[24] The County appealed the ruling and argued that because L&E § 9-630 expressly provided for the combination of scheduled and non-scheduled losses, the silence in L&E § 9-629 reflected that the Maryland General Assembly intended that such combinations be disallowed.[25]
The Court of Appeals noted that the case was one in which a statutory ambiguity arose because of, and was resolved in light of, an independent aspect of the Act that was not specifically at issue.[26] That is, the issue in the case pertained to tier two awards, but arose solely because of the tier three statute. Because Maryland courts are mindful of the need for coexistence within an overarching statutory scheme, the Robinson Court explained:
In determining whether the statute is clear or ambiguous, “[w]hen the statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, it is axiomatic that the language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation; rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole considering the ‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.’” Moreover, we interpret statutes within a statutory scheme with reference to one another even if the statutes were enacted at different times and do not refer to each other. We attempt, in that regard, to harmonize the statutes with each other and within the scheme without rendering any language or portion of the statutes meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory.
Section 9–629 is, when viewed in isolation, clear enough. There is nothing in the statute that prohibits the combining of awards, scheduled and for “other cases,” to justify an award at the compensation level it prescribes. Ambiguity as to whether compensation awards may be combined surfaces only when § 9–629 is compared with § 9–630, which governs compensation for the most serious permanent partial disabilities. That section expressly authorizes the Commission to combine awards resulting from a single accident in order to bring a claimant within its terms, entitling the claimant to enhanced benefits.[27]
To that end, the County argued that interpreting L&E § 9-629 to allow for a combination of injuries in line with L&E § 9-630 would result in rendering the legislature’s express authorization for purposes of serious disability “surplusage.”[28] In response, the court posited:
To be sure, the petitioners’ interpretation of § 9–629 as not permitting the combining of awards to make a claimant eligible for the enhanced benefits it provides does give effect to the “or a combination of awards” language in § 9–630 and avoids its being mere surplusage. On the other hand, it does not make the intent of the General Assembly in enacting § 9–629 in the form that it did clear, or stated differently, account for the apparent conflict between it and § 9–630. Moreover, their interpretation does not give effect to the remedial nature and purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.[29]
The court also noted that the language for tier two compensation “is quite broad and does not delineate or characterize . . . the injuries that would qualify the claimant for that level of compensation.”[30] As such, the court held that the lack of express authorization in L&E § 9-629 fails to “conclusively establish that it was the General Assembly’s intent to prohibit the combining of awards . . . . This is especially so because to interpret § 9–629 as prohibiting the combining of awards when such combination is expressly sanctioned in § 9–630 would lead to strange, unfair, and, therefore, illogical results.”[31]
Lastly, Robinson concluded by asserting that precedent “required” holding that award combinations be allowed in all cases of permanent partial disability.[32] This was because a hallmark of statutory construction mandates consideration of a statute’s underlying purpose.[33] In Maryland, the Workers’ Compensation Act is “remedial” in nature. As such, courts have repeatedly emphasized “that it ‘should be construed as liberally in favor of the injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.’”[34] In Robinson, the court believed that the County’s position would “undercut” the Act’s remedial nature, and instead elected to interpret the statutory ambiguity in favor of the injured employee.[35]
Principles of Statutory Construction Prohibit Interpreting Provisions of the Act in Isolation
As evidenced in Robinson, more often than not wrist injuries are construed as hand injuries for purposes of PPD. While doing so is arguably within the Commission’s authority, the following will explain that it is legally incorrect to view the wrist as part of the hand as a matter of law. Not only does such an interpretation offend the plain language of the Act, but it also leads to illogical results elsewhere in the statute and is inconsistent with the Act’s underlying purpose.
Elbows and Knees are considered part of the Arm and Leg
First, consider the only provision in L&E § 9-627 that references a wrist or ankle, subsection (g). Again, L&E § 9-627(g) states:
(1) An amputation at or above the wrist or ankle may be apportioned to the loss of the use of the arm or leg, but may not be less than the compensation for the loss or loss of use of a hand or foot;
(2) Amputation at or above the elbow shall be considered the loss of an arm;
(3) Amputation at or above the knee shall be considered the loss of a leg.
Under the plain language of the statute, it is undisputable that the WCC is permitted to award PPD for wrist amputations at the rate of either a hand or arm. In contrast, no such discretion is allotted to the Commission in the context of an amputation at the elbow. Rather, the Act mandates that such cases “be considered the loss of an arm.”
Likewise, the same is true for amputations at the ankle versus at the knee. The former may be construed as a loss of the foot or as a loss of the leg, whereas the latter constitutes a loss of the leg as a matter of law.
In order to calculate a PPD award for the loss of a wrist or ankle, L&E § 9-627(g)(1) must be “harmonized” with subsections (g)(2) and (g)(3). To find that the loss of a wrist or ankle is to be calculated as a hand or foot as a matter of law, quite plainly, fails to meet that objective; in fact it does the opposite.
Clearly, by enacting the three subsections of L&E § 9-627(g), the Maryland General Assembly intended to distinguish between wrists, elbows, ankles and knees in the context of hands, arms, feet and legs. Clearly, if the Maryland General Assembly intended that wrists and ankles be considered part of the hand and feet, respectively, it would have enacted legislation akin to (g)(2) and (g)(3), which compensates elbows and knees at the rate of arms and legs, with no discretion with the Commissioner to order compensation as a hand or foot. Instead, L&E § 9-627(g)(1) expressly authorizes individual Commissioners to consider the facts of a given case and decide whether to compensate amputations “at or above the wrist or ankle” as either “the loss of the use of the arm or leg,” so long as the total recovery is not “less than the compensation for the loss or loss of use of a hand or foot.”
Fingers and Toes are considered part of the Hand and Feet
Next, consider L&E § 9-627(b)-(c). In short, fingers and toes constitute part of the hands and feet because the Act prohibits compensating such injuries at the rate of arms or legs. L&E § 9-627(c)(3)(ii). This is akin to elbows and knees, which again are considered part of the arms and legs because the Act prohibits compensation at the rate of hands or feet. L&E § 9-627(g). Moreover, while fingers and the big toe are scheduled members in and of themselves under L&E § 9-627(b), the Act nevertheless permits “the loss or loss of use of 2 or more” fingers or toes to be compensated as a loss of a hand or foot under L&E § 9-627(c)(3).
The same inference that can be drawn from subsection (g) also applies to subsections (b) and (c). That is, if the legislature intended wrists and ankles to be construed as hands and feet, and not as arms or legs, then it would have enacted a provision akin to L&E § 9-627(c)(3)(ii), rather than providing the Commission with the unique discretion inherent in L&E § 9-627(g)(1).
Amputations are the functional equivalent of a total loss under the Act
Perhaps it is plausible to argue that subsection (g) is distinguishable from the rest of L&E § 9-627 because it specifically refers to amputations rather than a general “loss of use.” However, to expressly distinguish between loss of use and amputations in the context of wrist disabilities would be inconsistent with Maryland case law that aims to “harmonize” statutory schemes to avoid “illogical” outcomes.[36]
This situation is analogous to the Court of Appeals’ 2013 decision in Montgomery County v. Robinson, supra, where the Act was construed liberally in favor of the injured worker when the court held that scheduled and non-scheduled injuries could be combined in order to attain maximum compensation based on the various tiers of disability. Again, the statute for serious disability expressly authorized such calculation in the aggregate, whereas the statute for tier two disability was silent in that regard. The County argued that such a holding would make the express authorization in the serious disability statute “surplusage,” to which the court responded that to find otherwise “would lead to strange, unfair, and, therefore, illogical results.”
Although it can be argued that the legislature’s silence regarding the “loss” of wrists suggests that the discretion provided for in L&E § 9-627(g) applies exclusively to amputations, the stronger argument is that Robinson would support construing the silence in favor of the employee, which in effect would also avoid the “illogical” results that would undoubtedly arise if wrist amputations were to be treated differently than a general loss of use. In other words, an amputation “at the wrist” is, at its core, a total “loss of use” of that particular body part. Taken at face value, it would appear illogical to treat a wrist amputation differently than the total and permanent loss of same. This conclusion also coincides with L&E § 9-627(e), which refers to both amputations and loss of use in a similar fashion.
It is legally incorrect to view Wrist and Ankles as part of the Hand and Foot as a matter of law in light of the Act’s Benevolent Purpose
The year 2014 marked the 100th anniversary of the enactment of Maryland’s original Workers’ Compensation Act. Despite numerous modifications and amendments, the present Act retains the original’s underlying purpose and goals. In Robinson, the Court of Appeals reiterated:
We have stated [the Act’s] purpose as being “to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment,” and “to promote the general welfare of the State and to prevent the State and its taxpayers from having to care for injured workmen and their dependents, when under the law as it previously existed, such workmen could not recover damages for their injuries.” Consistent with this purpose, we have repeatedly emphasized the Act’s remedial nature and that it “should be construed as liberally in favor of the injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.”[37]
In drawing upon the Act’s remedial purpose, therefore, it follows that wrist injuries should be compensated as an injury to the arm when the facts of a case present a close call. This is because treating a wrist as an arm rather than a hand would lead to the most compensation for the injured worker. The same logic applies to ankles.
Indeed, the Act’s purpose played a large role in the Court of Appeals reversal of the decisions of the WCC, circuit court and intermediate appellate court in Robinson. At the very minimum, the above-quoted principles suggest that it is legally incorrect to view a wrist or ankle as part of the hand or foot as a matter of law, especially when considered alongside the only provision in the Act that mentions wrists and ankles—L&E § 9-627(g)(1).
Relevant Case Law
Although a Maryland appellate court has never expressly defined a wrist or ankle within the meaning of the Act, there is case law that is potentially helpful to that end. First, consider the 2005 case of Darden v. Mass Transit Admin.[38] There, the Court of Special Appeals defined a leg under L&E § 9-627 as encompassing “the loss of the use of the left knee.”
At this point, let it be noted that we attach no significance to the fact that the Commission, both prior to the first appeal and again after the remand, referred to the “loss of the use of the left knee,” whereas the circuit court jury had referred to the “loss of the use of the left leg.” Section 9-627(d)(v) refers to the loss of a “leg.” It does not make finer distinctions between the ankle, the calf, the knee cap, the thigh, etc. The loss of the use of a leg is the loss of the use of a leg, whatever the more particularized etiology for that loss might have been. Whenever the Commission writes “knee,” therefore, we shall, without qualm or hesitation, read “leg.”[39]
Noteworthy, Darden supports the above-argued construction of L&E § 9-627(g)(3), in that the knee is intended to be viewed as part of the leg as a matter of law. Perhaps even more enlightening, however, is the court’s express reference to the ankle in its definition of a leg. Mentioned alongside the thigh, knee cap and calf, and without reference to the feet or toes, the dicta in Darden may one day prove helpful in defeating the argument that an ankle is a foot as a matter of law.
In Smith v. Robert N. Pyles, Inc., the Court of Special Appeals similarly opined:
We think it unreasonable to believe that the legislature, in enacting the ‘specific injuries section’ intended the word ‘leg’ to have any other meaning than that usually given to it, i. e., from the head of the femur to the ankle or foot . . . . If the definition of ‘leg’ is to have some other meaning it is for the legislature to so determine.[40]
Before arriving at its conclusion, the court cited “[t]he generally accepted meaning of ‘leg,’” which “consists of three parts, that from the hip joint to the knee, from the knee joint to the ankle joint, and that portion below the ankle joint.”[41]
Accordingly, under the “[t]he generally accepted meaning of ‘leg,’” it appears as if an ankle is located in the second “part” of a leg—i.e. “from the knee joint to the ankle joint.” In contrast, the third “part” of a leg—i.e. the “portion below the ankle joint”—is very clearly referring to the foot. More notably, the use of the qualifier “below” reflects that the third part of the leg—i.e. the foot—does not begin until after the ankle joint.
Additionally, the Pyles Court was persuaded by an out-of-state case, wherein the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
The human body has two arms and two legs, or four limbs. A complete arm, in common parlance, extends from where it connects with the shoulder blade to the hand; and a complete leg extends from where the ball (head) of the femur fits into the socket of the hip to the ankle or foot.[42]
As one can see, the Pyles Court’s definition of a leg was taken nearly verbatim from the Arizona case. Although Pyles focused solely on the definition of a leg, the quoted portion of the Arizona case also included a definition of an arm—“[a] complete arm, in common parlance, extends from where it connects with the shoulder blade to the hand.”
Clearly, this definition implies that a wrist is part of the arm, as it expressly states that only where the hand begins, does the arm end. Obviously, from the shoulder down, the hand is past the wrist.
Again, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts should endeavor to effectuate the underlying legislative intent of a statute, and thus any uncertainty in Maryland’s Worker’s Compensation Act “should be resolved in favor of the claimant.”[43] Surely, accepting the definition of an arm, as provided in dicta in Pyles, better effectuates the Act’s benevolent purpose with respect to wrist injuries.
Relatedly, in 2008, the Iowa Supreme Court held that an injury to a wrist should be considered an arm for purposes of PPD:
By construing an injury to the wrist as an injury to the arm, a worker’s compensation is based on a 250-week maximum, rather than a 190-week maximum for an injury to the hand. This construction of the statute is consistent with our prior decisions finding the legislative intent behind the workers’ compensation statute is to apply this law broadly and liberally in favor of a worker when an ambiguity exists. Accordingly, as a matter of law a wrist injury is compensated as an injury to the arm.[44]
In a similar decision, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a trial court’s determination that an injury “at-above the wrist” is compensable as an injury to the arm, rather than a hand, even though the injury in question affected use of the hand.[45] The court was persuaded, in part, by the testimony of a “board certified orthopedic surgeon,” who “stated that, in orthopedic terms, the wrist is not part of the hand, but part of the upper extremity or forearm.”[46]
The decision out of Tennessee is akin to a 1949 case in Maryland. In Southern States Marketing Co-op v. Lippa, an injured worker “severed three tendons in her arm, in the region of the wrist.”[47] Despite the fact the injury affected the Claimant’s use of her thumb, the Maryland Court of Appeals nevertheless held that workers’ compensation was properly payable for the disfigurement to her arm.[48] Perhaps even more telling was the Lippa Court’s reference to the out-of-state case of Calumet v. Butkus, where an employee was injured in an explosion that embedded several hundred “specks of earth” in the Claimant’s “left wrist and forearm.”[49] Rather than treating the wrist as part of the hand, the court concluded that the employee was entitled to disfigurement compensation at the rate available for arm injuries.[50]
Conclusion
Presently, there exists an ambiguity in Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Code, specifically in regard to the precise compensation due for the “loss of use” of a wrist. Although wrists are more often treated as part of the hand for purposes of permanent partial disability, it is possible for Commissioners to stray from the norm and award compensation for wrist injuries at the rate of an arm.
Historically, the Act’s provision were required to be interpreted liberally and in favor of the injured employee, which would suggest that a wrist is more appropriately viewed as part of the arm, as such a conclusion would lead to an increased individual award. However, a literal reading of L&E § 9-627(g) suggests that the Maryland General Assembly does not view a wrist as part of the arm, nor the hand, but instead as its own individual entity.
Accordingly, in order to “harmonize” the various components of the statute, as well as to not offend precedent, it is the opinion of this author that Commissioners retain the discretion to compensate the loss of a wrist as either a hand or an arm, depending on the pertinent facts of a given case. That said, where the facts of case present a close call, a court’s role should go unquestioned; the law must be construed in favor of the injured worker.
Again, the same logic can also be applied to ankles.
[1] See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-627(e).
[2] Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-627(d)(1).
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-627(k).
[6] Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-627(d).
[7] See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Robinson, 435 Md. 62 (2013); Getson v. WM Bancorp et al., 346 Md. 48 (1997).
[8] Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-627(d).
[9] Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-627.
[10] See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Robinson, 435 Md. 62 (2013) (construing an injury to the “hand/wrist” as a scheduled member loss and a back injury as an “unscheduled” injury).
[11] See id.
[12] See, e.g., Marshall v. Univ. Of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 161 Md. App. 379, 381 (2005).
[13] See, e.g., Rahim Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Appellant’s Brief, 2013 WL 3489018 (Md. App.); Southern States Marketing Cooperative, Inc. v. Lippa, 193 Md. 385 (1949) (construing a laceration “in the region of the wrist” as an injury to the arm for PPD purposes, even though the injury affected the Claimant’s use of her thumb).
[14] See Ocean City Police Dept. v. Marshall, 158 Md. App. 115, 121 (2004) (citing Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471 (1995)).
[15] See Robinson, 435 Md. at 76-83.
[16] Id. at 76-77 (quoting Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419 (2007)).
[17] Id. at 77 (quoting Burnside v. Wong, 412 Md. 180, 194 (2010)).
[18] Id. (quoting People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 352 (2009)).
[19] Id.
[20] 435 Md. 62 (2013).
[21] See supra notes 31-34.
[22] Robinson, 435 Md. at 76.
[23] Id. at 77-78.
[24] Id. at 74.
[25] Id. at 76.
[26] Id. at 77-78.
[27] Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[28] Robinson, 435 Md. at 79-80.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 81.
[31] Id. at 81.
[32] Id. at 83 (citing Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 724 (2005)).
[33] Montgomery County v. Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 61 (2011) (citing Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-101(b)(1)).
[34] Robinson, 435 Md. at 82-83 (internal citations omitted).
[35] Id. at 83.
[36] Robinson, 435 Md. at 77-78.
[37] Id. at 82-83 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[38] 162 Md. App. 231
[39] Id. at 238-39.
[40] 20 Md. App. 478, 482 (1974).
[41] Id. at 481 (quoting 52A C.J.S. Leg p. 754 (1968).
[42] Id. at 482 (quoting La Rue v. Ashton Company, 2 Ariz. App. 101, 102 (1965); Ujevich v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 44 Ariz. 16, 18 (1934)).
[43] Holy Cross Hospital v. Nichols, 290 Md. 149, 162 (1981)
[44] Holstein Electric v. Breyfogle, 756 N.W.2d 812 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[45] Hudgens v. Royal & Sunalliance Ins. Co., M2001-02984-WC-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31814839 (Tenn. Workers Comp. Panel Dec. 16, 2002).
[46] Id. at *2.
[47] 193 Md. 385, 390 (1949).
[48] See id.
[49] Id. at 388-89 (discussing 113 Ind. App. 232, 47 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1943)).
[50] Id. at 388-89 (discussing 113 Ind. App. 232, 47 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1943)).
